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Unlike the mining industry, manufacture has no 
preference for the migratory type of labour, and 
indeed other conditions being equal, finds the stable 
urbanised worker more of an asset to production than 
the migratory labourer. 
Federated Chamber of Industries (FCD), 1951. 
Employers prefer this class of worker (migratory) to 
the urban Native. 
Johannesburg municipal Non-European Affairs Department 
(NEAD), 1955. 
State-controlled access to Afkican migrant labour has been an important component of 
the Apartheid system in each stage of its evolution. Even before the Nationalists1 
accession to power, however, organized commerce and industry - both English- and 
Afrikaans-speaking - denounced the migrant labour system as a costly and wasteful 
source of African labour. lAlthough opposed to any sudden or drastic measures, the 
AHI, FCI and ASSOCOM alike called for the gradual phasing out of the migrant labour 
system as a means of "stabilizing1f the African work force in secondary industry and 
commerce, and improving its productivity. Yet, at the same time, industrial and 
commercial employers often exhibited a marked preference for migrant labour over 
allegedly more plstablelf and productive urbanized workers. Throughout the 19508, 
municipal administrators country-wide reported that 
frequently strong prejudice is expressed by 
industrialists against the employment of Native labour 
already domiciled and housed within the confines of 
the particular to~n,~and strong efforts are made to 
import rural labour. 
Organized commerce and industry, and municipal administrators - both 
familiar with the urban labour market - thus presented apparently incompatible 
assessments of the relationship between the migrant labour system and the interests 
of secondary industry and commerce during the 1950s. Can they both be right? And 
how did the paradox arise? And, since the entrenchment of the migrant labour system 
was an integral' feature of the statevs influx control policy in the 1950s, what does 
this paradox signify about the relationship between industrial and commercial 
interests and state policy in the 1950s? 
These questions, about the nature of urban capitalist interests, on the 
one hand, and their relationship to the state's influx control policy, on the other, 
are amongst the central issues dividing so-called l1liberalsff and lgrevisionistsgt in
the "Apartheid-Capitalism Debate". In the early 19705, revisionist scholars such as 
Harold Wolpe and Martin Legassick elaborated an important critique of the view, 
prevalent amongst many Liberals, that the Nationalists1 policy on migrant labour was 
economically irrational and starkly at odds with industrialistsf interests. Wolpe 
and Legassick drew attention to the striking economic growth rates of the 1960s as 
prima facie evidence of the functional compatibility between Apartheid policies and 
capitalist interests. In their view, the Nationalists' entrenchment of the migrant 
labour system provided secondary industries with an abundant supply of cheap lgbour, 
which contributed profoundly to the profitability of the country's industries. 
Merle Lipton's book, Capitalism and Apartheid, attempts to rebut the 
revisionist argument about the merits of the Nationalists' migrant laboy policy for 
the expansion of secondary industries and commerce. Like Ralph Horwitz , for 
example, Lipton argues that the migrant labour system burdened industrialists with 
l'unstableft, inefficient and unproductive workers. Although she recognizes at one 
point that the "owners of the small, inefficient factories set up during the warff5 
had different priorities, thg thrust of her argument is that employers Ifgenerally 
favoured higher wage levels" , linked to improvements in productivity, made possible 
by substituting lvstable'f urbanized for migrant labour. 
The opening paradox presents both Lipton's thesis and the original 
revisionist position with difficulties. Liptongs analysis is supported by the FCIts 
indictment of the migrant labour system. However, the municipal reports that 
employers actively asserted a preference for migrants to fill unskilled positions 
sit uncomfortably with her largely unqualified assertion that "manufacturing and 
commercial capital did not need, and indeed opposed, most apartheid labour 
policiestf, including the migrant labour policy. If the tendency to prefer "rural 
labourIt was sufficiently prevalent to have dominated municipal assessments of 
employersf interests, then clearly Lipton's analysis is limited. 
Wolpe and Legassick's thesis, on the other hand, has the inverse problem: 
strengthened by the municipal reports, it takes no account of the opposition mounted 
by organized commerce and industry against continued recourse to migrant labour. If 
the migrant labour system was wholly in line with industrial interests, why would 
organized industry have issued repeated criticisms of it? 
7 Doug Hindson's analysis of the interests of manufacturing capital in the 1950s is an advance on both positions, and points to their common failing: neither 
takes account of industry's and commerce's interest in a differentiated work force, 
which was part migrant and part urbanized, with different pros and cons attaching to 
the employment of each. For Hindson, therefore, the apparently contradictory 
assertions about employers' interests presents no problem. 
However, Hindson goes on to argue that industrialistsv interest in 
differentiated forms of African labour power was thoroughly compatible with, and 
indeed a principal determinant of, the state's migrant labour policy in the 1950s. 
His case on this issue is often confusing and unclear, but one strand of 
argument seems to run as follows: the processes of industrial expansion during the 
1940s had generated a growing demand for more "stable", semi-skilled labour, in 
addition to the demand for cheap, unskilled labour. While industrialists were 
content to draw on migrant labourers for unskilled work, urbanized workers were more 
"stableu and therefore a preferred source of semi-skilled labour. The Nationalists' 
influx control policy, which restricted the access of migrant workers to the cities, 
served both facets of this differentiated labour demand. Firstly, he argues, state 
intervention restricting the supply of migrant labour to the t wns was necessary to 8 
resolve "a crisis of the reproduction of African labour power" in the cities. 
Employers looked to the urban proletariat to meet the growing demand for flstablen' 
semi-skilled labour power. But, by the late 19408, large numbers of migrant workers 
had swamped the urban labour market, competing with the urbanized proletariat for 
jobs. The result was that urban wages were depressed "below a level sufficient to 
maintain a proletarian family without supplementary sources of income". Therefore, 
the reconstitution of the urban proletariat to meet 
the changed requirements of industrial production 
necessitated the erection of barriers agahnst the 
competition of temporary migrant workers. 
The Nationalists' influx control policy addressed employers1 need to 
reproduce the "stable1', urbanized work force by restricting the number of migrants 
entering the cities in search of employment, and thereby reducing the economic 
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takes account of industry's and commerce's interest in a differentiated work force, 
which was part migrant and part urbanized, with different pros and cons attaching to 
the employment of each. For Hindson, therefore, the apparently contradictory 
assertions about employers' interests presents no problem. 
However, Hindson goes on to argue that industrialists' interest in 
differentiated forms of African labour power was thoroughly compatible with, and 
indeed a principal determinant of, the state's migrant labour policy in the 1950s. 
His case on this issue is often confusing and unclear, but one strand of 
argument seems to run as follows: the processes of industrial expansion during the 
1940s had generated a growing demand for more "stable", semi-skilled labour, in 
addition to the demand for cheap, unskilled labour. While industrialists were 
content to draw on migrant labourers for unskilled work, urbanized workers were more 
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resolve "a crisis of the reproduction of African labour powertt in the cities. 
Employers looked to the urban proletariat to meet the growing demand for 'lstablew 
semi-skilled labour power. But, by the late 1940s, large numbers of migrant workers 
had swamped the urban labour market, competing with the urbanized proletariat for 
jobs. The result was that urban wages were depressed "below a level sufficient to 
maintain a proletarian family without supplementary sources of income". Therefore, 
the reconstitution of the urban proletariat to meet 
the changed requirements of industrial production 
necessitated the erection of barriers aga'nst the 
competition of temporary migrant workers. 6 
The Nationalists' influx control policy addressed employers' need to 
reproduce the "stable", urbanized work force by restricting the number of migrants. 
entering the cities in search of emp'loyment, and thereby reducing the economic 
in the countryside. After selling his appamage in 1927, Champion came increasingly 
to rely on the ICU itself for his source of income. As Detective Arnold noted, Itif 
the ICU ceased jjg function tomorrow (Champion) would have to work pretty hard to 
make a livingl1. Macebo, as the third son of a Groutville farmer who owned 15 
acres of land, abandoned the hope of retaining access to a rural income and sought 
work in Durban. Jim London, despite being the son of a wealthy landowner at 
Italeni, came to depend on work as a compositor and then as a compound b&ma in 
Durban for his income. If it was as refugees from the narrowing economic horizons 
of rural life that some of the key ICU yame Natal leaders entered Durban, it was 
often as frustrated semi-skilled and skilled wage-earners that they entered the 
Union. 
The salaried positions of ICU gaec Natal officials represented one way of 
retaining a brittle economic independence. A n  ICU official, depending on the state 
of Union funds, could earn at least E8 a month. In &g29 Champion himself was 
drawing a relatively handsome salary of E20 a month. There was a variety of 
other ways in which ICU organizers in Durban could harness the Union to recoup for 
themselves more secure positions within the ranks of the middle classes. The 
clearest example of this is to be found in the establishment of the All African 
Co-operative Society in 1927. The Co-operative Societ6, described as the "greatest 
step to economic emancipation of the African Workers" , attempted to attract El 
subscriptions from workers. By June 1928 the Society, having been incorporated into 
the ICU yase Natal, had only 400 subscriptions and operated under the name of the 
Star Clothing and Shirt Factory. This enterprise provided work for over fifty men 
and women, including Bertha Mkize and her brother (one of Durban's first44frican 
tailors), who were supplied with an outlet for their down-graded skills. It is 
small wonder that the ideology of this frustrated petty bourgeoisie should have 
taken the form of economic nationalism which owed more than a little to Garveyite 
notions of black self-improvement. Caleb Mtshali, for example, exhorted workers at 
a mass meeting to: 
be independent, commence small stores yourselves, and 
make it a strict rule to deal no where but from your 
own colour ... we have one sound trading concern now, 
that is a clothing factory ... we will ode1 our plans 
on the system of the American Negroes. 49 
The African Workers' Club set up by Champion in 1925 was, in spite of its 
name, inspired by the desire to create a sense of community amongst this aspirant 
middle class. Certainly the philosophy behind the Club - "Ask for what you want, 
Take what you can get, Use what you havef1 - would have struck a chord amongst its 
members, who were drawn prefgminantly from the ranks of the "shoemakers, bicycle 
menders and stall holders". 
Whereas the first Branch Secretary came to rely on the sale of chickens to 
supplement his income, Champion proved more ambitious in this regard. By 1928 he 
had established two businesses: a general dealer's store and the Natal Boot and 
Shoe Repairing Hospital. The name of Champion's store, Vcllca mika (Africa Awake), 
was certainly a symbolic acknowledgemat of Union officials1 indebtedness to the 
separatist vision of black Americans. It seems that Champion was not averse to 
financing these businesses, both of which collapsed in 1929, with Union funds. 
Furthermore, Union members were increasingly exhorted to underwrite a constellation 
of Union-based ventures such as the African Workers' Club and the local ICU paper, 
Udibi lwase Afrika, with subscriptions from their meagre wages. 
Perhaps it was the uneven reception of these appeals which encouraged more 
peremptory forms of Union recruitment. AS Charles Khumalo recalls, organizers 
fostered the belief amongst the more credulo~~ migrant workers that Union membership 
was a prerequisite for obtaining employment. Yet high-handed leadership styles 
might have resonated with workers1 experience of an older political culture which 
assigned individuals particular places within an hierarchical social order. The 
generational gap between prominent Durban Unionists (many of whom had been born 
during the 1880s) and younger workers could have strengthened rather than diminished 
leadership's authority. Certainly Jacob Cele, a young harness-maker at the time and 
later Ladysmith Branch Secretary, saw nothing wrong in the fact that 'lbecause we were 
pressures which had depressed urban wage levels to "crisisw proportions. At the 
same the, by restricting all new entrants to the towns to the status of temporary 
migrants, the Nationalist~i~influx control policy also served employers' interest in 
"unskilled migrant labourn (although he devotes little attention to this facet of 
employers' interests and its relationship to the influx control policy). 
However, Hindson's case that industrial capital recognized the necessity 
for influx control barriers to resolve the "crisis of the reproduction" of urbanized 
labour power is unconvincing. If industrialists were so concerned that urban wages 
were so low as to jeopardize their labour supply, they would surely have raised 
wages of their own accord, without depending on the state to erect influx control 
barriers to achieve the same end. 
This paper re-examines the design and application of the state's influx 
control policy in the 19508, and takes issue in several respects with Hindson's 
understanding of the relationship between this policy and industrialists' interests. 
Hindson claims that the state's administrative differentiation between 
urbanized city-dwellers and temporary migrants was functionally compatible with the 
economically differentiated demand for African labour, both by dcreigp and in 
practice. A closer look at the design of the influx control policy will reveal that 
the state's intention was to overrule the market forces which tended to concentrate 
migrants in many unskilled jobs to the exclusion of urbanized workers. As far as 
the architects of state policy were concerned, it was necessary to minimize the 
numbers of Africans entering the cities to take up employment, by placing urbanized 
Africans in both unskilled and semi-skilled jobs ahead of migrants. The 
administrative differentiation between urbanized city dwellers and temporary 
migrants was intended thus to cut across the economically differentiated demand for 
semi-skilled and unskilled labour, not to fall in line with'it, as Hindson claims. 
The decade therefore saw a continuing conflict between the state's interest in 
restructuring the urban labour market and employers' interest in retaining existing 
patterns of employment. 
The relationship between employers' interests and the practice of influx 
control depended on how this conflict was resolved. In most cases, employers' 
interests prevailed, reproducing the tendency for urbanized and temporary migrant 
workers to concentrate in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs, respectively. However, 
in those cases where the original intentions of the policy were realized, employers' 
demands for "rural labour1' were frustrated and unskilled labour shortages ensued. 
It is argued, fffally, that the employers of urbanized labour had little, 
if any, economic interest in the state's influx control policy - either as it was 
designed or in the form in which it was applied in practice. 
This discussion begins with a brief description of the design of the 
state's influx control policy in the 19508, followed by a summary of employers' 
interest in "differentiated forms of labour powert*. The third and fourth sections 
of the paper then assess how these interests compare with the design of the influx 
control policy, on the one hand, and its practical application, on the other. 
1. The Design of Influx Control Policy 
Legassick has argued that one of the distinguishing features of Apartheid in the 
1950s was the state's systematic extension of the migrant labourl~stem operative on 
the mines to secondary industry and conunerce in the urban areas. But, as it 
stands, his thesis is incomplete because it omits to take account of the particular 
farm of this migrant labour policy. By 1948, the use of migrant labour in secondary 
industries bnd commerce was already a well established practice. The architects of 
the Nationalists' "Nativew policy set out to entrench the migrant labour system in 
the towns, but by imposing wholly new restrictions and regulations governing 
employers' access to migrant labour. 
The substance of this policy was shaped by the pursuit of two equally 
fundamental objectives in respect of the urban areas. The first was to remedy the 
alleged ffmaldistributionll of African labour between the white farms and urban 
businesses, without starving urban employers of a (numerically) adequate supply of 
labour. That is the supply of African labour to the cities was to be 
"rationalized", so as not to exceed the "legitimatew demand. The state's second 
objective was simultaneously to restrict the size of the urban African population as 
far as was economically llpracticall'. 
Policy-makerst efforts to synthesize these objectives relied heavily on an 
influx control policy which was two-pronged. First, Africanst access to the towns 
would be restricted as far as possible to bona fide work-seekers, on a temporary 
basis only, unaccompanied by their families. The size of the urbanized African 
population would thus be frozen, the numbers of Africans in the towns swollen by 
migrant workers only. Second, however, even the numbers of migrants entering the 
towns as temporary residents were to be restricted, in terms of an urban labQur 
preference policy (ULPP). Thf3ULPP was designed as a means of eliminating the 
presence of "large surpluses" of African labour in the cities, which white farmers 
condemned as one of the causes of agricultural labour shorta~zs. Declaring the need 
"to employ every possible Bantu legally domiciled in a town" , the state intended 
the ULPP to ensure "the placement of the ~&ty Bantu in jobs which are now in 
practice reserved for migrant labourers". White employers in any given town would 
therefore be compelled to exhaust the resident labour supply before being permitted 
to import additional, migrant, labour from outside the town. 
It is essential that measures be instituted to utilise . 
available supplies in the urban areas ... until all 
permanent urban sources of labour (*werkskragtet) have 
been used, f ther influx (*toestromingl) is 
undesirable. l% 
The ULPP occupied a central position in the design of the influx control 
policy, since it would, supposedly, serve multiple purposes. By ensuring the 
l'improved economic utilisationql of the resident urban African population, the ULPP 
would limit the number of migrant workers necessary to meet the urban demand for 
African labour. In this way, employers in the towns would be guaranteed the number 
of workers they required, the exodus of African labour from the farms would be 
reduced, and the growth of the urban African population would be limited as far as 
possible without damaging the interests of urban employers. 
The 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act (which amended, inter alia, the 1945 
Urban Areas Act and the 1911 Labour Regulations Act) gave legal substance to the new 
influx control policy. The amended Section lO(1) of the Urban Areas Act recognized 
three categories of I'urbanizedl1 Africans who qualified for the "residential right" 
to remain in a particular prescribed (urban) area on a de facto permanent basis: 
1) Africans who had been born and continuously resident in the area - 10(l)(a) 
qualifiers; 2) Africans who had served one employer for ten years, or several 
employers within the same prescribed area for fifteen years - 10 (l) (b) qualifiers ; 
and 3) the wives and dependants of a 10(l)(a) or (b) qualifier, who were "ordinarily 
resident" with him - 10(l)(c) qualifiers. Any African who did not fall into one of 
these three categories - such as migrant workers with less than ten years' service - 
were treated as "temporary sojo~rners~~ in a prescribed area, their sojourn there 
dependent on securing official permission - in terms of section 10(l)(d). 
The terms of section 10(1), then, provided the legal vehicle for the ULPP. 
According to the Labour Bureaux Regulations, published in the wake of the 1952 Act, 
unless a Native was born and is permanently resident 
in an urban area, or is otherwise legally entitled to 
remain permanently in the area (i.e. qualifies under 
10(l)(a), (b) or (c)), the Native will not be allowed 
to register for, or take up, employment in the urban 
area while there are unemployed workseeker~~in the 
area who are legally entitled to be there. 
The 1952 legislation also provided for the creation of a national network 
of labour bureaux, empowered to exercise comprehensive and systematic control over 
the allocation of African l a b o ~ ~ t o  urban employers. All work seekers were required 
to register with labour bureaux , while urban employers were instructed to register 
all vacancies for African labour with their local labour bureaux. In this way, 
labour bureaux officials could ensure that urban work seekers were placed in 
employment. ahead of migrants. 
One further facet of the state's influx control policy which had an 
important bearing on manufacturing and commerce was the singularly strfet 
restrictions on "foreign" Africans' access to employment in the towns. According 
to the Tomlinson Commission, by 1951 approximately 215,000 "foreign*' workers were 
employed in secondary and tertiary h~dustries (as compared with 210,000 in 
agriculture and 225,000 in mining). However, in a determined bid to diminish the 
number of "foreigners" entering the towns, the Secretary of Native Affairs 
stipulated that, "with certain exceptions, Extsf-Union Natives are prohibited from 
working in urban areas anywhere in the Union". 
How, then, did this influx control policy, and the restrictions it imposed 
on urban access to ("foreignt1 and Union-born) migrant labour, square with 
manufacturing and commercial interests of the day? 
2. Manufacturing and Commercial Interests in African Labour During 1950s 
The demand for African labour in manufacturing and commerce was structured by at 
least two principal variables: firstly, the level of skill required for the job; 
and, secondly, the perceived differences between migrant and urban workers. A brief 
survey of the effects of each variable in turn will then explain the manner in which 
they tended to intersect. 
2.1 Factors Influencing Relative Demand for Unskilled and Semi-Skilled 
African Labour 
Having received an immense boost during the war, manufacturing expanded 
dramatically until the late 1950s. Between 1948/49 and 1957/58, the number of 
private manufacturing establishments rose from.13,879 to $9,838, and the value of 
their gross output grew from 610 to 1,503 million pounds. The war effort also 
engendered a fundamental change in the structure of manufacturing: whereas, "at the 
outbreak of the Second World War what secondary industries re were could, 'with 
few exceptions, by no means be classed as capital-intensive3', the war effort 
stimulated a massive injection of capital into manufact~ing, which sponsored an 
unprecedented degree of mechanization and modernization. This process of capital- 
intensification continued to accelerate during the 19508, as is indicated by the 
fact that between 1948/49 and 1955 the annual percentage rate of growth of fixed 
capital per establishment (between 13% and 19%) was significantly higher than the 
annual perce@age rate of growth in the number of employees per establishment (about 
4 per cent). 
This expansion and restructuring of secondary industry had a profound 
effect on the demand for African labour. A shortage of skilled artisans opened up 
new avenues for Africans, although these were narr2~ed by pressure from white trade 
unions and ideological barriers amongst employers. The more significant 
development was the incorporation of increasing numbers of Africans into semi- 
skilled operative positions, created as new machinery was installed and erstwhile 
skilled tasks were deskilled. According to J Sadie, between 1936 and 1960, the 
percentage of skilled and semi-skilled worker~~in the African manufacturing work 
force rose from 10=5 per cent to 16 per cent. 
While continuing capital-intensification was an important feature of 
manufacturing development during the decade, it is also important to recognize the 
constraints on that process. Despite the concentration of manufacturing capital in 
a growing number of large concerns, the average size of industrial establishments 
remained small. In 1953/54, 65% of these employed fewer than 9 workers, and 9% 
fewer than 49 workers.28 The smaller the concern, the greater the difficulties in 
raising the capital necessary to mechanize its operations. On the other hand, cheap 
unskilled African labour was abundantly available, its bargaining position weakened 
by the denial of African trade union rights and by the fact that barriers on 
Africansf entry into skilled work intensified competition for unskilled jobs. 
Therefore, while the proportion of Africans in skilled and semi-skilled 
positions continued to rise during the decade, the large majority of Africans 
employed in manufacturing - 84 per cent in 1960 - remained unskilled workers. 
African employment in commerce expanded even more dramatically than in 
manufacturing: between 1946 and 1960, the African work orce in commerce increased 
by approximately 99.5 per cent, from 69,281 to 138,~~O.~' But the proportion of 
unskilled workers was still higher than was the case in manufacturing. According to 
research conducted for the Tomlinson Commission, 8$J0per cent of Africans working in 
wholesale and retail trade were unskilled in 1952. 
2.2 Factors Influencing Relative Demand for Urbanized and Migrant Labour 
The existence of the migrant labour system also had important effect in 
structuring the demand for African labour. Demographically, the system created 
three categories of Africans working in the towns: (1) urbanized workers; (2) 
those who had recently migrated to the towns with the intention of settling there; 
and (3) temporary or oscillating migrants, who maintained a permanent home elsewhere 
(usually in a rural area). However, indu~trialists~~fategorization f the urban 
African work force typically differentiated nly two distinct categories - "tribal 
or territorial, and urban or detribalised". 32 
The pros and cons which employers attached to taking on wtriba118 migrants, 
as opposed to urbanized workers, derived as much from ideological constructs and 
stereotypes as from real differences in work patterns. "Tribaln migrant workers 
were helg3to be "more obedient, harder working, and ... more easy to satisfy and 
controltv than "detribalised" workers. While still steeped in their wtriballl ways, 
migrants were deemed to be far less susceptible than permanent city-dwellers to 
"c~mmunistic'~ influences, and generally more d~cile,~gisciplined and submissive to 
authority. "Rural labouru - and Zulus in particular - were also purportedly 
"better suited to heavy industrial work", their strength uncorrupted by the 
"decadence" of city life. Employers and municipal administrators reported that the 
so-called "raw" migrant worker, inexperienced, untrained and vulnerable, was less 
likely than the city-dweller to r gguse tlobnoxiouslt employment on the grounds of low 
wages or poor working conditions. According to the FCI, "foreignM migrants were 
the least ttchoosylt of all: "experience has prove9 that foreign natives are more 
than willing to accept ... obnoxious employmentw. 6 
However, it was widely conceded that employing migrants also had its 
disadvantages. Large numbers of migrants returned to the Reserves annually for 
about three months during the ploughing season, and their return to the same job 
could not be guaranteed. Also, migrants were often less literate and numerate, with 
an initially poorer command of English or Afrikaans than workers born and bred in 
the towns. 
1fDetri991ised11 work seekers, on the other hand, were widely type-cast as 
"cheeky", lqlazylt and unreliable, especially when ftsemi-educatedl*. In the words of 
a senior compound manager for Union Steel Corporation, 
The detribalised ... group has today become a problem. 
He (sic) is the young, semi-educated, arrogant, 
demanding and won't work type. He is difficult to 
handle because he is very prone to disobedience and 
has, invariably, no inclination to work unless forced 
to do so ... The result is you have a worker 
performing a task which he is forced to do and does so 
ineffiently ... Industries in my area have discovered 
that this group has become unsound and uneconomical 
labour to employ because they leave when they w&h, 
and for the slightest provocation or reprimand. 
Urbanized workers, particularly the school-leavers, were also labelled as Iqjob 
choosynt and Itwork shy", because they tended to refuse the notoriously unpopular 
jobs, involving long or irregular hours and paying poor wages - such as hotel or 
dairy industry, domestic service, heavy manual jobs in the engineering industry or 
stone quarries. As the FCI noted, 
Native workers ... especially the permanent urbanised 
Native ... are becoming3gore selective as to their 
employment occupations. 
In the majority of cases, manual or menial work wi 
only be accepted by Natives of the migratory type. ha 
2.3 Resultant Dual Tendencies in Urban Demand for African Labour 
No doubt individual employers attributed different importance to the 
relative pros and cons of taking on migrant, as opposed to urbanized, workers. But, 
on the whole, two overall tendencies were evident. 
1) First, when employers required African labour for more skilled work, they 
generally (although by nomeans invariably) preferred urbanized workers. As the FCI 
explained, 
the increasing productivity and specialisation of ' 
Native labour in semi-skilled and operative categories 
... is dependent on stability of labour and 
maintenance 81 training and occupational 
advancement. 
The efficiency of the t@ining process depended, moreover, on what the FCI called 
"the quality of labour" , which improved with prior industrial training or 
experience, fluency in English or Afrikaans, literacy and numeracy. 
Migrants therefore tended to be regarded as unsuitable for more skilled 
work, either because of the "quality" of their labour and/or because their periodic 
departures during the ploughing season rendered them an ltunstableft source of labour. 
For the same reason, training migrant workers was generally not considered a cost- 
effective investment. 
However, there are several important caveats to this argument. In some 
cases, employers ranked the advantages attaching to tlrural labourft above those of 
urbanized labour, irrespective of the level of skill or training involved. This 
generalized prejudice vas directed particularly against the younger and "semi- 
educated" Africans from the townships. Instead of welcoming several years of 
township schooling as an asset in the training process, employers were often 
suspicious that education bred "agitationtf by heightening awareness and 
expectations. 
Also, employers1 experience did not always confirm the widespread belief 
that migrant workers were ffless stableft than their "detribalisedi1 counterparts. As 
the Tomlinson Commission reported, its evidence on this issue was "contradictory in 
nature". 
Some data reveal the settled labourer as a more steady 
worker, while others suggesJ that the migrant labourer 
is superior in this regard. 3 
Some further studies on the subject during the course of the decade 
indicated that age and marital status were also relevant variables: labour turnover 
amongst lldetribalisedlf male WO ers was generally higher among young, single men 
than among older, married men. stLf 
Lastly, in areas where the proportion of urbanized to migrant labour was 
relatively small - such as Durban - employers often had little option but to employ 
migrants, irrespective of the sort of work involved. 
Overall, however, as the FCI reported in 1957, 
the need for specialisation, and increasing and 
improved training is resulting in the establishment of 
a labour pattern whereby ... the semi-skilled 
operative position~~are usually occupied by permanent 
urbanised workers. 
2) The second tendency, widely reported by municipal and NAD officials, was a 
preference for "tribalisedf1 labour for unskilled work. For, different priorities 
tended to dominate the recruitment of labour for a range of unskilled, as opposed to 
semi-skilled and skilled, work. 
Economists of the day, along with organized commerce and industry, 
exhorted industrialists repeatedly to improve the productivity of Af'rican labour 
(unskilled and semi-skilled) by means of 
better selection and placement of workers ... better 
supervision, better opportunities for advancement and 
promotion of workers, systems of wage payment which 
provide incentives to increase output, more attention 
to physical working conditions and wagfare facilities 
and to industrial safety and health. 
But, in most cases, these calls fell on deaf ears. As the Institute of 
Administrators of Non-European Affairs put it in 1957, 
employers jib at modernising their old-fashioned 
organisations ... Planned training of employees and 
cultiv@ing a sympathetic attitude is absent in most 
cases. 
For, amongst the majority of industrial and commercial concerns, securing cheap, 
docile, unskilled labour was demonstrtkly more of a priority than I1stabilising ... 
the workers". For much of the decade , industrialists resisted calls to increase 
unskilled wages, on the grounds that these could be afforded only if labour 
productivity was imggoved - but paid little, if any, attention to ways of promoting 
these improvements. Instead, persistently poor wages and working conditions 
reproduced a high labour turnover, which in turn hindered labour productivity and 
thereby reinforced the original barriers to labour wstabilisationft and wage 
increases. 
Employers locked into this cycle had some compelling reasons to choose 
IrtribalisedN migrants in preference to "detribalised" workers. As F J Language, 
Brakpanfs Manager of Non-European Affairs, explained, 
many employers of unskilled labour prefer to engage 
the 'raw1 Native who does not belong to any trade 
union, who is unaware of industrial legislation and 
wage regulations,and who is quite content, temporarily 
at least, to submit to the stipulations and demands of . 
the employer in all respects concerning an ordinary 
contract of service. There is a tendency among private 
employers of native labour, especially in the big 
towns, to prefer the immigrant labourer to the town 
native, the deciding factor here being the fact that 
the wage of the former is mu@ lower than that 
demanded by the town native. 
Since most manufacturing concerns in the 1950s were still small and primarily 
labour-intensive, this tendency was numerically the most predominant and 
conspicuous. Hence the consensus amongst municipal administrators that overall 
"employers prefer this (migratory) class of worker to the urban Native". 
To what extent was this differentiated labour demand compatible with the 
design of the NAD's influx control policy and the particular form thereby imposed on 
the migrant labour system? 
3. Relationship between Employers' Interests and Design of Influx Control Policx 
In order to recognize the conflict between employers1 interest in unskilled migrant 
labour. and the design of the state's influx control policy in the 19508, we must 
examine the assumptions underpinning the "logic" of the ULPP. 
The state offered little in the way of an economic explanation or defence 
of how the ULPP would work. The exponents of the ULPP glibly referred to it as an 
economically "rational1' policy on the grounds that it facilitated the matching of 
labour supply and demand. But this process was crudely conceived in quantitative 
terms, treating labour supply and demand as if homogeneous quanta. In terms of the 
logic of the ULPP, if, in any given town, the collective demand was for X number of 
African workers and the size of the local economically active African population was 
X*, then there was purportedly no good economic reason to bring more labour into 
the area, until the owth in the size of the local demand exceeded n. The ULPP 
took little, if any5: account of qualitative differentiations in the labour supply 
(either along lines of skill, training, education, or between migrant or urbanized 
workers) and the effects these had in differentiating employers1 demands. 
The state had good reasons for endorsing this simplistic model of the 
labour market. As we have seen, it seemed to promise a means of limiting the growth 
of the urban work force - and, therefore, also the growth of the urban African 
population at large - to the economically "rationalM minimum. But the logic of the 
policy was clearly at odds with industrial and commercial employers' interests in 
African labour. For, in terms of the ULPP, the "rationalf' way for urban labour 
demands to be met was by channelling urbanized work seekers into both semi-skilled 
and unskilled jobs ahead of "tribalf' migrants. The design of the policy therefore 
took no account of the existing preference for migrants to fill unskilled positions. 
On the contrary, the architects of the policy set out expressly to challenge this 
preference, on the grounds that it led to the l'wasteful'v utilization of the 
urbanized labour supply, and caused the urban work force to expand much more than 
was economically "rational" and politically desirable. 
Nor was the influx control policy wholly in line with the interests of 
those industrialists drawing on urbanized workers to fill the better paid, more 
skilled positions. Although access to the urbanized labour supply had theapproval 
and backing of the state, the policy required all employers to secure urbanized 
workers through the labour bureaux, rather than by recruiting them independently. 
But industriali'sts in search of urbanized labour had nothing to gain by submitting 
to the labour bureaux system, since they experienced no difficulty in meeting their 
labour needs on their own. Furthermore, the instruction to fill their vacancies 
with labour supplied by a labour bureau burdened employers with time-consuming and 
costly bureaucratic red-tape. They were also denied the opportunity to select 
between various candidates for a particular job according to their past job 
experience or training. 
One of the basic objectives shaping the design of the influx control 
policy of the 1950s was, as we have seen, the state's declared commitment to 
"meeting the legitimate labour requirements" of employers in the t m s .  It is now 
clear, however, that, in order to reconcile this economic objective with the 
political imperative of restricting the number of Africans entering the urban areas, 
the state defined these "legitimate labour requirements1' in a way which conflicted 
with employersf own perception of their interests. 
However, much - but not all - of this conflict of interests was dissipated 
by the practice of influx control, which deviated in important ways from the design 
of the policy. 
4. Application of Influx Control Policy in Practice 
The NADfs &ability to apply the influx control policy according to plan derived in 
large part from the business.community1s opposition to it. This took one of two 
forms: by-passing labour bureaux altogether; or, when the aid of labour bureaux 
was sought, aggressively asserting a preference for migrant labour in defiance of 
the ULPP. According to a FCI survey in 1956, only 38% of the firms surveyed used 
labour bureaux to obtain labour, and, significantly, almost none of these were 
seeking to fill semi-skilled or other sought-after positions. As the survey report 
commented, 
the more highly skilled and experienced workers, and 
employers offering better paid, more desirable jobs, 
used the open market and avoided the labour bureaux. 53 
However, the open market was also the preferred source of labour for 
employers who did not need the labour bureaux' help in procuring unskilled labour. 
By-passing the labour bureaux freed them from the constraints of the ULPP. 
It was largely employers offering jobs and wages which were too 
"obnoxiousT' to @tract workers on the open market who appealed to the labour bureaux 
for assistance. But they, too, exerted considerable opposition to the ULPP, in 
demanding that the labour bureaux supply them with isrural', rather than 
!.detribalisedG, labour. As W J P Carr, then Manager of Johannesburg NEAD, recalled, 
confronting employers with the urban labour pggference regulations involved him in 
':a constant argument every day of your lifei:. 
Typically, according to Carr, it was the employers' demands for migrant 
labour which held sway over the ULPP. NAD regulations required that these sorts of 
demands be referred by the local labour bureau (a municipal body) to the Native 
Affairs Commissioner (an officer of the NAD). The Commissioners varied in their 
preparedness to yield to employers' pressures. The FCIts memoranda contain several 
complaints of labour shortages caused by the intransigent enforcement of the ULPP 
(see later). But more often than not employers' demands were accommodated in the 
knowledge that unemployed urban Africans could not simply be marshalled by force 
into jobs they did not want. As Carr remarked, his disputes with the Native Affairs 
Commissioner (NAC) on employers' behalf were typically long and acrimonious - but 
ultimately victorious. 
In other cases, the NAC delegated requests for "rural labour" to the 
municipal level, where industrialistsf interests generally received a more 
sympathetic hearing. For, municipal administrators, while licensed by the NAD, were 
employees of the local authority, which had a strong interest in promoting the cause 
of the local business community. 
All in all, then, as the FCI reported in 1956, f'few5i;f any labour bureaux 
are operating strictly according to the Bureaux Regulations". Although the ULPP 
was central to the design of the state's influx control policy, employers in the 
towns were sufficiently powerful to have rendered the ULPP largely inoperative in 
practice. As the Interdepartmental Report on "Idleness and Unemployment Among Urban 
Bantub' (1962) concluded, 
the anomaly exists, that (African) workseekers from 
outside the urban areas are admitted in, despite t 
fact that there is already a surplus in the towns. t;t S 
Without the enforcement of ULPP, the prmddce of influx control policy not only 
sanctioned preferential access to migrant labour; it also exh&d the existing 
stock of benefits accruing to employers drawing preferentially on migrant workers. 
These additional gains derived from practical impact of Sections lO(1) and 
12 of the Urban Areas Act on the African labour supply. These clauses 
differentiated the African workers and work seekers into the following categories: 
1) those with the "residential right" to remain in a particular prescribed 
(urban) area, irrespective of whether, or for how long, they remained in the 
employ of whites (lO(l)(a), (b) and (c) qualifiers - all Union-born); 
2) those with permission to stay in an urban area for 14 days in order to 
look for work, and then only as long as the job lasted (lO(l)(d) qualifiers - 
again, union-born); 
3) wforeign" Africans already in a job, whose "rightft to remain in the 
prescribed area depended on their remaining with the same employer (in terms of 
section 12); 
4) all those (Union-born and I1foreign) in search of work, without official 
authorization to live and seek work in an urban area - that is, the thousands 
of ltillegalw ork seekers continually vulnerable to the threat of being 
"endorsed out" if discovered by the authorities. 
The differentiation between these four groups created varying degrees of 
vulnerability and scope for occupational choice. Only 10(l)(a), (b) and ( c )  
qualifiers were legally permitted to stay in an urban area if and when unemployed. 
This concession allowed them a greater degree of security while taking the time 
needed to seek the sort of jobs preferred. Work seekers with 10(l)(d) permits, on 
the other hand, were liable to be "endorsed out" of an urban area if they failed to 
find work within 14 days. As the Johannesburg NEAD pointed out, this group was 
therefore 
prepared to accept lower wages and menial wggk ... in 
order to obtain a foothold in Johannesburg. 
- a remark equally applicable to other prescribed (urban) areas. 
ntIllegalslt "had their backs to the wall to an even greater extent". 59 
Their dependence on employers' preparedness to take them on "illegally" and not 
expose them to the authorities weakened their bargaining power to challenge 
~~obnoxi~us~~ working conditions and abysmal wages. As the Master Builderst 
Association pointed out, 
these unregistered Bantu ... show a loyal (sic) and 
willingness to work not always evidenced by those 
possessing passes which pefjmit them to easily leave 
one job and find another. 
The application of section 10 (l), then, rendered migrant workers - both 
ftlegall* and "illegal" - all the more vulnerable and "willing to accept obnoxious 
employmentw. Pak-adoxically, the practice of influx control thereby reinforced the 
very market forces which the ULPP had been designed to override - namely, the 
tendency for "rural labourIt to be channelled into unskilled work, irrespective of 
the availability of local "detribalisedW labour power. 
However, the NACs and municipal administrators did not invariably waive the 
ULPP. In some cases, much to the chagrin of organized commerce and industry, 
employers1 preferences for migrant labour were overruled, despite the fact that 
urbanized work seekers were wont to refuse the more "obnoxious" and poorly paid 
manual jobs. This sort of bureaucratic intransigence w a s  sufficiently widespread to 
have provoked sporadic complaints from employers that, "although there may be an 
overall adequefy of labour, shortages occur in the more manual and menial 
occupationst1. 
The state was strictest in its adherence to the ULPP when the employment 
of "foreign1' migrant labour was at issue. The state's policy restricting 'Iforeign1' 
Africans' access to the urban areas had been centralized in the hands of the 
Secretary of Native Affairs himself, in order to circunysnt all avenues for 
municipal laxity. However, statistics cited by Simkins suggest that this policy 
was relatively loosely applied in the smaller towns, in comparison to the 
metropolitan areas where, in Verwoerdts words, 
in regard to Foreign Natives we are merciless ... this 
might deprive industry of good employees, but ... 
Union Natives6$ould, with training, be made to fill 
their places. 
But, as far as employers were concerned, it was not their training which 
distinguished foreign workers as such Itgood employees". Rather, foreign workers had 
become indispensable to employers insistent on keeping unskilled wages for unpopular 
jobs down to levels which urbanized and the more experienced migrant job seekers 
refused to accept. The state's restrictions on the use of "foreign1' labour in the 
cities therefore contributed to the labour shortages Itin the more manual and menial 
occupationsft. 
Of course, the major factor responsible for the persistence of the various 
shortages of unskilled labour was employers' refusal to make the l'obnoxioustt jobs 
more popular by increasing their wages. As the FCAqrecognized, it was ''low rates of 
pay offered ... and unpleasant working conditions" which reproduced their 
shortages. Yet employers looked to the state, rather than market forcea, to resolve 
these shortages. The persistence of these shortages was therefore a reflection of 
employers1 determination to keep wages down, even if it meant enduring the 
inconvenience of labour shortages in certain categories. 
This paper began with a paradox which gave rise to two questions: the 
first concerning the nature of manufacturing and commercial interests in migrant as 
opposed to urbanized African labour, and the second concerning the relationship 
between these interests and the state's influx control policy during the 1950s. In 
answer to the first, it has been argued, along with Hindson, that the paradox 
derived from the heterogeneity of employerst interests. Whereas the FCI1s viewpoint 
reflected the interests of those industrialists with a growing demand for Itstable2, 
semi-skilled or unskilled African labour, municipal administrators's reports 
recorded the numerically more conspicuous demand for unskilled Ifrural labour". 
In answer to the second question, the relationship between these interests 
and the influx control policy was more conflictual than Hindson's argument 
recognizes. In design, the influx control policy imposed unnecessary constraints on 
employers with an interest in urbanized labour, by attempting to channel all African 
employment through the labour bureaux. More significantly, the ULPP threatened to 
impede employers' access to migrant workers as the preferred source of unskilled 
labour. The ensuing conflict of interests between the architects of state policy 
and employers was manifest in widespread defiance of the Labour Bureaux Regulations. 
Urbanized labour was recruited independently of state apparatuses, and the employers 
of unskilled labour were generally powerful enough to safeguard their preferential 
access to migrant labour. With the ULPP largely inoperative, the practice of influx 
control further heightened the advantages of employing migrants for unskilled work - 
thereby reinforcing the very market forces which the influx control policy had been 
designed to check. However, employers' powers were limited in certain cases. Most 
notably, the state largely had its way in overruling the demand for "foreigntt 
migrant labour in the metropolitan areas. 
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